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1. In a crisis folded within the broader COVID-19 pandemic, public procurement
during the pandemic suddenly seemed incapable of satisfying its raison d’être,
namely, to provide public institutions with the supplies they needed—the masks,
personal protective equipment and respirators desperately needed by medical
personnel, patients and ordinary citizens all over the world. This crisis of confi-
dence in public procurement deepened as hundreds of press articles,1 radio and
TV debates around the world, specialized magazines and blogs2 (the reaction on
the internet has been almost as rapid as the pandemic) exposed the dark corners
of public purchasing of medical supplies, revealing countless failures in this
obscure corner of public administration.
2. On a legal level, the COVID-19 crisis, decidedly unlike any other, called into
question many pillars of public procurement law, including the long-standing
assumption that direct negotiation between public buyers and sellers should
be avoided if  at all possible.3 The crisis overturned the traditional order of the
public procurement market: with the sudden spike in public demand, suppliers
and intermediaries took over the somnolent markets traditionally dominated by
public buyers. The pandemic, like Pandora opening her legendary box, released
many evils as well as hope—hope that stems from the new perspectives lent by
the pandemic.
3. With this article we wish to review some of the most important elements of
this purchasing crisis, specifically the key disruptive forces which stand in stark
contrast to traditional approaches to public procurement. Several disruptions
warrant attention:
1 L. Folliot Lalliot, La concurrence entre États dans les chaînes d’approvisionnement public aggrave la crise sanitaire (Competition 
among countries in public supply chains worsens health crisis) Le Monde (March 30, 2020).
2 C. Yukins, Blog:  Publicprocurementinternational.com, with a special entry for the procurement issues related to the COVID 
crisis, https://publicprocurementinternational.com/resources-on-covid-19-and-public-procurement.
3 The COVID-19 crisis also affected the procurement rules covering contract performance, which are addressed in more detail in 
C. R. Yukins, U.S. Procurement and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. (Sweet & Maxwell, forthcoming). In the 
United States, the COVID-19 crisis also spawned an important experiment in using procurement contracts to ensure econom-
ic stability, under the $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act signed by President Trump on 
March 27, 2020. See C. R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Maximizing Recovery: Contractor Reimbursement for COVID-19 Paid 
Leave Under § 3610 of  the CARES Act, 62 Gov. Contractor ¶ 156 (Jun. 10, 2020)..
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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 crisis upended markets and 
assumptions in public procurement, and 
posed an almost existential threat to 
traditional procurement systems. Seismic 
changes in economic relationships – 
governments were no longer monopsonists, 
government officials failed as economic 
intermediaries between suppliers and the 
public, and supplies that were traditionally 
treated as private (such as medical 
equipment) suddenly became “public” goods 
under worldwide demand. Traditional trade 
rules were rendered irrelevant, as the goal 
was no longer simply to open individual 
procurements but rather to open borders 
to intense global demand. Although 
the disruption was revolutionary, ironically 
the solution is to return to first principles 
of transparency and integrity to preserve 
governments’ fragile legitimacy in a crisis. 
La crise du COVID-19 a bouleversé les 
Marchés et les certitudes en matière d’achats 
publics et a constitué une menace quasi 
existentielle pour les systèmes traditionnels 
de passation de marchés publics. 
Changements sismiques dans les relations 
économiques : les gouvernements n’étaient 
plus des monopsones ; les responsables 
gouvernementaux ont échoué en tant 
qu’intermédiaires économiques entre 
les fournisseurs et le public ; les fournitures 
qui pouvaient être traditionnellement 
considérées comme privées (tels que 
les équipements médicaux) sont 
soudainement devenues des biens "publics" 
sous la pression de la demande mondiale. 
Les règles habituelles de la commande 
publique internationale sont devenues non 
pertinentes, l’objectif n’étant plus simplement 
d’ouvrir des marchés publics au cas par cas, 
mais plutôt d’ouvrir les frontières à une 
demande mondiale intense. Bien que la 
perturbation ait été révolutionnaire, 
ironiquement la solution est de revenir aux 
premiers principes de transparence et 
d’intégrité pour préserver la légitimité fragile 
des gouvernements en cas de crise.
Blog:  
http://www.PublicProcurementInternational.com.
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– The temporal disruption, with the unprecedented and
forced acceleration of purchasing procedures;
– The competition disruption, which caused an inversion
of the characteristics of the public purchasing market;
– The epistemological disruption, i.e., the destruction of
assumptions grounded in a monopsonist’s market with
sudden competition between public buyers;
– The geographic disruption due to the global dimension
of the voracious public demand;
– And finally, the protectionist disruption—the way the
pandemic paradoxically both fed and made nonsense of
the nationalism that normally surrounds public procure-
ment markets.
4. After these observations, we will propose possible
solutions, while mindful that the pandemic’s extraordi-
nary disruptions, though novel and jarring, were linked
to an exceptional situation of shortage across a limited
range of supplies. The pandemic’s lessons should not be
generalized beyond reason to dismantle the entire public
procurement regime. But if  the pandemic has laid bare the 
need to rethink emergency public purchasing procedures,
the crisis should also trigger other improvements to tradi-
tional public purchasing mechanisms, while remaining
true to fundamental principles. As the discussion below
reflects, the lessons from the pandemic reinforce procure-
ment’s traditional principles, for the pandemic showed
why it is necessary for public purchasers to:
– Restore transparency and integrity even in emergencies; 
– Learn to buy through an international supply chain;
– Learn to buy collectively;
–  Regulate from a holistic perspective that can adjust to
rapid changes in public markets.
I. Opening Pandora’s
box: The pandemic’s
disruptions
1. The temporal disruption:
The rapid obsolescence of
the so-called “emergency”
purchasing procedures
in the context of
the coronavirus crisis
5. One of the abiding assumptions in public procure-
ment is that time flows like water—time is considered a
bountiful resource, one that can be freely allocated to
resolve inefficiencies in a system built around the agent—
the purchasing official—rather than the principal (the
government and its users).4 Leisurely timelines are set by 
statutes and regulations, not by user’s needs or market 
exigencies. Thus, for example, in important part because 
a purchasing official may not have sufficient market 
information, the U.S. system requires that a competi-
tion be held open for 30 days after notice of the solicita-
tion is published,5 to allow the market to respond; after 
award, the European rules call for a 10-day “standstill”6 
period to give disappointed bidders a chance to chal-
lenge any mistakes ; and the U.S. system allows another 
100 days for a bid challenge to be resolved.7 Time allows 
the purchaser’s (the agent’s) mistakes to be corrected, and 
the opportunity costs caused by long delays are typically 
borne by the user and the contractor—not the agent/
official. Where the opportunity costs of delay are acute 
and unbearable, when there is a real emergency, then the 
rules allow expedition by short-cutting the normal notice 
and competition requirements, but even then the rules 
anticipate an orderly process and at least some measure 
of transparency.8 All of that, however, collapsed in many 
places relatively early in the pandemic.
6. To cope with the swelling medical needs during the
pandemic, public purchasing procedures loosened
through successive phases over the course of a few
weeks. Even if  some purchasing authorities expected in
February 2020 (as the pandemic emerged) to launch open 
bidding processes (that is to say, to follow traditional
procedures), this first recourse to traditional bidding
procedures quickly reached its limits because the dead-
lines for filing and examining offers were simply incom-
patible with the rapidly rising medical demands.
7. Then, from mid-March  2020, at least for France,
the so-called “emergency” procedures with shortened
advertising deadlines (fewer than 15  days instead of
35 days) seemed the right solution under the European
Procurement Directives. To this end, the French govern-
ment published an interpretation note of March  18 to
encourage public buyers to reduce the usual deadlines.9
8. However, this approach also quickly showed its limita-
tions, because an even less restrictive third procedure, the
negotiated procedure without prior publicity under the
4 See, e.g., M. C. Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of  the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econs. (1976),  https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=94043; O. Soudry, A Principal-Agent Analysis of  Accountability in Public 
Procurement (2007), in Advancing Public Procurement:  Practices,  Innovation  and  Kno
wledge, G. Piga and K. V. Thai, eds. (PrAcademics Press, 2007), https://www.seman-
ticscholar.org/paper/A-Principal-Agent-Analysis-of-Accountability-in-Soudry/f3e10f-
90dcf7606e67db88ed0a0eafce1ca82234; C. R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing 
Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model, 40  Pub. Cont. L.J.  63 (2010), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1776295.
5 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 5.203, 48  Code of  Federal Regulations (CFR)
§ 5.203, available at www.acquisition.gov.
6 e.g., European Directive 2007/66/EC, art. 2A (2007) (on standstill period).
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Bid Protests: A Descriptive Guide, 
Timetable, https://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/bid/timetable.html.
8 e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Guide to 
Enactment of  the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, at 36–37 (2014) (ex-
plaining how traditional open tendering gives way to emergency procurement procedures).
9 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, Direction des affaires juridiques, La passation et 
l’exécution des marchés publics en situation de crise sanitaire (Mar. 18, 2020). Ce
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European directives, was much more flexible and seemed 
better adapted to the runaway situation of the COVID-19 
market. After all, the purchases needed to deal with the 
brutal emergence of the epidemic perfectly met the regu-
latory definition of urgency, and even of extreme urgency 
under the European rules, that is to say a situation which 
is unpredictable, irresistible and external. As a result, 
the European Commission recommended the negoti-
ated procedure without prior publication or direct agree-
ment for use by the European Member States on April 1, 
2020.10 
9.  But, with the pandemic’s escalation at the end of 
March, and the unbridled demand in the market for 
personal protective equipment desperately sought after 
by major world players, the expedited procedures under 
traditional rules, though exceptional, were themselves 
abandoned by many public buyers in favor of direct 
orders, without transparency or open competition, in 
clear violation of long-established procurement rules and 
international standards. Market players were explicit: if  
available supplies could not be purchased and paid for 
quickly—sometimes within minutes—those supplies 
could go to another buyer.11
10.  With the rise of these purchasing techniques 
without any supervision, the traditional pillars of public 
purchasing collapsed. Some nations, such as Algeria, 
the Central African Republic, China, Mexico, Poland, 
Senegal and Zimbabwe adopted laws specifically allowing 
contracting authorities to derogate from their public 
procurement laws in making contract awards and admin-
istering public contracts during the COVID-19 emer-
gency.12 Faced with the rising tide of a pandemic, public 
buyers found themselves caught between the oppor-
tunistic demands of suppliers and the urgency to meet 
needs—to the point that the traditional bulwarks, the 
principles of transparency and competition that under-
gird public procurement—gave way. The COVID-19 
crisis thus upended the traditional assumptions that 
shape public procurement.
2. The competition disruption: 
A supplier market
11. Another abiding assumption in public procurement 
has long been that, because of governments’ massive 
10 Commission Communication, Guidance from the European Commission on using 
the public procurement framework in the emergency situation related to the COVID-
19 crisis (2020/C 108  I/01), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0401(05)&from=EN. 
11 For a contemporaneous discussion of  the unfolding situation in world markets, 
see Webinar – Straight Talk: Emergency Procurement in the COVID-19 Pandemic 
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/27/
emergency-procurement-in-the-covid-19-pandemic-april-2-2020.
12 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.
imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#P; M. Kania 
(University of  Silesia in Katowice), Public Procurement and COVID-19 in Poland 
(2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
Public-Procurement-and-COVID-19-in-Poland.-Michal-Kania.-31-March-2020.docx; 
Open Contracting Partnership & ONG 3D, When Covid-19 Confirms the Need for Open 
Contracting in Senegal (2020), https://www.developmentgateway.org/OC-Senegal.
purchasing power, public procurement is a “buyer’s” 
market—indeed, the government is often the only buyer, 
in a monopsony. This explained why public purchasers 
could afford to underinvest in market engagement: 
suppliers focused on the public market, to survive, would 
accommodate government delays and transaction costs. 
The problem was magnified in a way not fully under-
stood before the pandemic, because public markets were 
literally buyers’ markets, structured around contracting 
officials who serve as purchasing intermediaries. All of 
that turned upside-down in the crush of the pandemic, 
as sellers of critical supplies took the upper hand. While 
public markets in principle allow public buyers to take 
advantage of a dominant position (even a monop-
sony in certain sectors, such as armaments), in a market 
normally characterized by a multitude of suppliers 
who compete for the public bonanza, the situation was 
completely reversed in the context of the health crisis. 
Taking advantage of the surging demand from govern-
ments that suddenly became competitors in purchasing 
the same products, suppliers and sometimes unscrupu-
lous intermediaries not only set prices far above previous 
prices but also demanded conditions normally prohibited 
by public procurement rules (such as advance payment). 
Worse still, as suppliers abandoned commitments to 
public purchasers to take advantage of new, more attrac-
tive prices, certain contracts were not honored.
12.  Across the globe, direct buying on vendor terms 
replaced orthodox public procurement techniques that 
traditionally require scrupulous checks on company guar-
antees and a tightly framed system of advance payments. 
On March 24, for example, a cross-section of front-line 
purchasers from Europe and the Americas explained 
during an international webinar how buyers’ and sellers’ 
relative power had reversed in the pandemic.13 Obliged to 
find vital supplies as quickly as possible, Italian procuring 
entities had been authorized by a succession of excep-
tional regulatory provisions14 to accept vendors’ demands 
for advance payments which are normally prohibited in 
Italian public procurement law. 
13.  To understand the scope of this supply crisis, it is 
necessary to segment the analysis according to the types 
of markets, between industrialized and developing econ-
omies. Not only has public demand grown exponen-
tially during the pandemic, but for certain off-the-shelf  
commercial products such as masks or hydroalcoholic 
gels, private demand has helped multiply needs and exac-
erbate competition among potential buyers. This imbal-
ance in the market for health supplies first struck the 
most developed countries, which were better able to cope 
with the resulting rising prices. On the other hand, the 
delayed spread of the pandemic in the poorest countries 
raised other questions, in particular whether the interna-
tional community would provide necessary support as 
13 Webinar – Public Contracts and the Coronavirus – Online Colloquium 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/03/16/
public-contracts-and-the-coronavirus-online-colloquium-march-24-2020.
14 Dentons Files, COVID-19 and derogations from the procurement code in 
Italy (Mar. 16, 2020), available at https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
covid-19-and-derogations-from-the-52116. Ce
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those poorer nations confronted radically higher prices. 
This growing rift in the market, exacerbated by competi-
tion between buyers, was finally addressed by the World 
Bank in early May 2020, when it proposed to assist its 
beneficiary nations through a new means of assistance, 
by presenting vendors to interested governments.15
3. The epistemological 
disruption: Competition 
between public buyers
14. As was noted above, the pandemic uprooted classic 
means of procurement because scarcity of critical 
supplies gave suppliers control in the market. The 
global and savage competition for scarce supplies had 
another disruptive effect: it pitted governments against 
one another, turning complacent monopsonists into 
aggressively competing buyers. This disruption might 
be termed an epistemological one—one that threat-
ened to destroy the premises for the discipline of public 
procurement—because it raised serious questions as to 
whether procurement should be left to corps of public 
procurement officials governed by a commonly recog-
nized set of norms and rules. This disruption thus ran 
much deeper, for when governments competed openly 
against other governments, and governments were held 
publicly accountable for their failures to procure essen-
tial supplies, stakeholders asked aloud whether the public 
procurement system might not be replaced by another 
logistical arrangement better able to meet users’ needs. 
The crisis in the market, in other words, led to a crisis in 
confidence, and opened the door to a fundamental shift 
in the way we think about public procurement.
15.  Thanks to a rush for common medical supplies, as 
noted the logic of public purchasing was reversed, and 
vendors found themselves in a dominant position to raise 
prices; at the same time, because the pandemic caused 
the same health calamity in many nations simultane-
ously, governments competed with each other fiercely for 
supplies, even within the same country. As the pandemic 
unfolded over days and weeks, public reports revealed 
the intensity of competition between governments, some 
with considerable financial means—China, the United 
States, Italy or France in particular—against others much 
less wealthy such as North African countries that were 
quickly affected by the pandemic and those of sub-Sa-
haran Africa to a, so far, lesser extent. 
16. But governments’ competitive purchasing during the 
pandemic also devastated weaker public buyers within 
nations, such as local governments, public hospitals or 
retirement homes, which were trying to protect their 
workers and their patients. Here again, the competitive 
situation strongly disadvantaged small public buyers. The 
search for key equipment such as masks became a true 
15 E. de Laurentis, COVID-19: How the World Bank is helping countries procure critical 
medical supplies, https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/covid-19-how-world-bank-help-
ing-countries-procure-critical-medical-supplies?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_
EXT&deliveryName=DM63224.
race, such as through online auction sites in the United 
States on which both public central purchasing bodies 
and large public buyers positioned themselves for vital 
purchases. 
17.  This startling competition between public buyers 
reflected major shortcomings in coordination and collab-
oration, and unforeseen limits to decentralization or feder-
alism, sometimes fueled by political concerns, as demon-
strated by the situation in Spain. In the United States, 
the Trump administration’s willingness to use federal 
powers16 to usurp state governments’ purchasing—liter-
ally, to seize supplies which had been bought by state 
governments, even though state governments constitu-
tionally have first responsibility for public health—even 
led some state governors to threaten the use of force to 
block federal requisitions of medical devices. This would 
have resulted in a direct confrontation between federal 
and state armed forces, essentially unknown since the 
U.S. Civil War ended in 1865.17 This was clearly a market 
in collapse, a dystopian marketplace.
18. To understand the depth of this disruption, and the 
scope of the potential remedies, it is important to stress 
that this was a crisis of legitimacy: the governments that 
could not procure vital goods in a time of natural disaster 
risked losing their mandate to govern. The assumption 
that has always informed critical thinking about public 
procurement is that, however inefficient it may be, the 
established system of public procurement is preferable 
to the chaotic and corrupt buying that would otherwise 
undermine governments’ legitimacy. The pandemic in 
many ways destroyed that assumption, and as the discus-
sion below will show, this conceptual revolution—this 
destruction of the epistemological foundations of public 
procurement—may lead to radically different pathways 
for reform.
4. The geographic disruption 
19. International trade instruments which address public 
procurement, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), 
were gradually built after World War II to facilitate access 
for foreign vendors by removing non-tariff  barriers to 
public procurement markets18. By way of illustration, at 
the European level, the legal framework of the EU Public 
Procurement Directives was designed to encourage 
16 L. Folliot Lalliot, Comment Trump instrumentalise l’approvisionnement en masques aux 
États-Unis, Website of  the French weekly news magazine L’Express (Apr. 20, 2020), avail-
able at https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/idees-et-debats/comment-trump-instrumental-
ise-l-approvisionnement-en-masques-aux-etats-unis_2124131.html.
17 See, e.g. Z. Kanno-Youngs & J. Nicas, ‘Swept Up by FEMA’: Complicated Medical Supply 
System Sows Confusion, N. Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2020) (noting that the “Trump administra-
tion’s new method for distributing medical supplies has led to charges of  confiscation”), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/coronavirus-fema-medical-supplies.
html.
18 See, e.g., R. A. Anderson & A. C. Müller, The Revised WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and Significance for Global Trade and 
Development (2017), WTO Staff  Working Papers  ERSD-2017-04, World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division, https://ideas.repec.
org/p/zbw/wtowps/ersd201704.html. Ce
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European public contracting authorities to broaden 
their base of suppliers beyond preferred local vendors: 
per the GPA, above certain monetary thresholds, not 
only European companies but also vendors from other 
members of the GPA (such as Japan and South Korea) 
are eligible to compete without discrimination. 
20.  Acting as an accelerator, the pandemic has driven 
open public procurement markets, forcing Western 
contracting authorities (even the most reluctant19) to 
turn to Asian suppliers to fill domestic gaps in supply. In 
fact, production of key COVID-19 medical supplies was 
highly concentrated in China20 a country which is not (for 
the moment) party to the GPA, and which does not have 
a trade agreement governing procurement trade with the 
European Union or the United States. 
21.  Consequently, this episode of massive interna-
tional public procurement took place largely outside the 
trade instruments that were designed to facilitate public 
procurement trade. This apparent paradox arose because 
these instruments were designed to redirect trade in a 
stable global public procurement market, and those who 
framed the agreements did not foresee such a catastrophic 
situation. Certainly the trade negotiators envisaged the 
possibility of a public health crisis,21 but then only to 
allow a State Party to refuse access to foreign companies, 
and to purchase solely from domestic companies. 
22. In the COVID-19 upheaval, nations found themselves 
in the precisely opposite situation, in which they hoped to 
increase their purchases from foreign suppliers.22 In one 
prominent example of this conundrum, the United States 
lifted restrictions on the sale of certain key supplies which 
would normally be subject to the Buy American Act.23
23.  The COVID-19 crisis thus revealed a bias deeply 
embedded in international public procurement trade 
instruments: in order to facilitate access for foreign 
companies, these instruments (such as the GPA) focus 
on a relatively narrow band of trade barriers—overtly 
discriminatory measures such as “buy national” laws 
and crabbed procurement procedures devised to exclude 
foreign vendors. By focusing on ex ante requirements in 
order to stimulate competition, these trade instruments 
19 Senior members of  the Trump administration have indicated that the United States is con-
sidering withdrawing from the Government Procurement Agreement, e.g., R.D. Anderson 
& C. R. Yukins, Withdrawing the United States from the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA): Assessing Potential Damage to the U.S. and Its Contracting 
Community, 62 Gov. Contr. ¶ 35 (Thomson Reuters, Feb. 12, 2020), GWU Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2020-08; J. Heilman Grier, Significance of  Access to Sub-central 
Procurement under GPA, 6 May 2020, available at https://trade.djaghe.com.
20 See S. Evenett et al., Global Trade Alert, Tackling COVID-19 Together (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.globaltradealert.org/reports/51. 
21 R. A. Anderson, Keeping markets open while ensuring due flexibility for governments in a 
time of  economic and public health crisis: the role of  the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA), 2020 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
22 However, we can advance the idea that this exception could play in the future if  the coun-
tries which launched mass productions of  sanitary products and equipment found them-
selves in a situation of  surplus: they would then be tempted to invoke this exception of  
public health to favor local suppliers. 
23 https://interact.gsa.gov/document/gsa-fas-temporarily-allows-award-non-taa-compli-
ant-products-under-mas-program-respond-covid. 
have largely overlooked the upstream controls and certi-
fications which this pandemic showed can be much more 
important to cross-border trade in public procurement 
markets. Even within the framework of the European 
Public Procurement Directives, which do address certi-
fications and restrictive labels in European procurement 
markets, the gaps in the regulatory structure became 
clear when governments purchased Chinese supplies 
incompatible with European standards,24 and goods with 
fraudulent certifications with counterfeit labels used by 
malicious suppliers. The pandemic showed, in sum, that 
while trade negotiators had long sought to open inter-
national procurement markets, how those trans-border 
procurements would work in practice too often had been 
ignored.
5. The protectionist disruption: 
Emergency trade controls 
on essential supplies 
24. Just as too little attention had been paid on how to 
control cross-border trade, the pandemic showed that 
there are far too few controls in place to keep trade 
channels open when they are essential to save lives. 
Protectionism—both import and export controls—
ran riot in the pandemic, as governments responded to 
popular pressures to close their borders. Those trade 
restraints included efforts to “on-shore” production of 
essential supplies by discouraging foreign competition, 
and export controls to keep critical supplies from flowing 
abroad. Because of the uneven spread of the pandemic, 
and the need to respond flexibly to new outbreaks in new 
populations, these clumsy trade barriers threatened to 
increase the death toll from the pandemic.
25. The phenomenon of a speculative market with a sharp 
spike in demand is a well-known economic circumstance, 
and is especially common in petroleum markets. But it is 
very rare in public procurement markets for many coun-
tries to seek large quantities of the same supplies around 
the world. It should be noted that this sudden surge in 
demand did not come from all countries simultaneously, 
since the epidemic struck successively at different times 
and to varying degrees; peak demand was reached when 
there was convergence of demand from countries which 
had particularly high purchasing power (the United 
States, Europe). These countries therefore found them-
selves in competition to buy the same products, which 
came primarily from domestic sources and China (since 
Chinese production was predominant in masks and 
personal protective equipment (PPE)). 
26. The case of China is particularly interesting because, 
as the first country to fall victim to the pandemic, and 
a primary source of essential medical supplies, China’s 
reaction had a major collateral impact on international 
24 To deal with this situation in the urgency of  the COVID crisis, the European Commission 
and CEN (European Committee for Standardization) have made free access to European 
standards for missing medical supplies s in order to facilitate increase of  production 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_502). Ce
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public purchasing operations.25 The Chinese government 
quickly opted for strong collaboration between the public 
and private sectors by combining both the purchasing 
and production functions in a structure dedicated to the 
fight against COVID-19. The Chinese firms were thus 
able to benefit from fiscal support measures to embark 
on the massive production, the State having undertaken 
to buy any surplus.26
27. Many other countries resorted to aggressive import 
and export controls in an attempt to maximize access 
to essential supplies and materials. To husband their 
available supplies, for example, some nations in Europe 
imposed new controls on exports, which the European 
Union quickly moved to channel—but not abolish—by 
asserting its prerogative to control trans-border trade.27 
In the United States, President Trump triggered the 
federal government’s powers (though after a widely crit-
icized delay28)—through the Defense Production Act of 
1950,29 a Cold War-era statute which gave Trump broad 
authority to control production and distribution of key 
supplies. Trump used that authority under the Defense 
Production Act in a number of emergency measures, 
including one to block exports of certain PPE.30 The 
Trump administration also started the process of 
“on-shoring” key manufacturing of medical supplies,31 
a long-term, multi-faceted initiative which (among 
other things) is expected to use domestic preferences in 
procurement to encourage U.S.-based manufacturing, to 
secure supply chains for future crises but also to further 
the Trump administration’s “economic nationalism” and 
create U.S. manufacturing jobs to bolster Trump’s polit-
ical base. (The European Union notably eschewed this 
“on-shoring” strategy, recognizing the deeply established 
international supply chains for medical supplies.32)
25 See Webinar – Straight Talk: Emergency Procurement in the COVID-19 Pandemic, op. 
cit. (discussion by CAO Fuguo, Professor at the Law School of  the Central University 
of  Finance and Economics (Director, China Procurement Research Center) (Beijing, 
China)). 
26 In the United States, the federal government bears a similar risk of  surplus production 
through standard termination for convenience clauses, which provide that if  contracts are 
terminated prematurely for the government’s convenience, the government will reimburse 
the contractor its sunk costs. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.249-2, 
48 C.F.R. § 52.249-2, Termination for Convenience of  the Government. For a broader dis-
cussion of  the standard clauses and their role in the U.S. government’s allocation of  risks 
in the pandemic, see C. R. Yukins, U.S. Procurement and the COVID-19 Pandemic, op. cit. 
.
27 Thus the European Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of  
14  March  2020 making the exportation of  certain products subject to the production 
of  an export authorization, that is COVID-19-related supplies, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020R0402. 
28 C. R. Yukins, Trump’s Procurement Mistake May Cost American Lives (Mar. 20, 2020), 
Blog Public Procurement International, available at https://publicprocurementinterna-
tional.com/2020/03/20/trumps-procurement-mistake-may-cost-american-lives.
29 [50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 et seq.] Available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-da-
ta/20130726-1650-20490-5258/final__defense_production_act_091030.pdf  
30 On April 10, 2020, the Federal Emergency Management Agency imposed export controls 
under the Defense Production Act on personal protection equipment, including certain 
masks and gloves.
31 See, e.g., A. Swanson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on 
Drugs, N.  Y. Times (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/
economy/coronavirus-china-trump-drugs.html. 
32 A. Beattie & J. Brunsden, EU should ‘not aim for self-sufficiency’ after coronavirus, trade 
chief  says, Financial Times (Apr. 23, 2020), available at www.ft.com.
28.  These were just some of the many trade controls 
that countries around the world imposed, in aggressive 
efforts to garner a larger share of scarce international 
supplies33—protectionist measures which, it should be 
noted, followed years of mounting protectionism during 
a period of rising nationalism in many nations.34 Those 
trade restrictions magnified the global economic dispar-
ities between rich and poor nations—disparities which 
were highlighted even more harshly when press stories 
emerged of the buying power of wealthier nations, such 
as reports of agents carrying suitcases full of cash to 
preempt other buyers for critical supplies.35
29. These trade measures limiting the import and export 
of critical medical supplies had secondary effects which 
were only dimly understood during the pandemic. 
Because of the slow and uneven spread of the pandemic 
around the globe, demand for lifesaving supplies 
surged in different countries at different times. These 
trade measures remained in place, however, even as the 
pandemic receded and demand declined in the nations 
which had imposed these controls. As a result, it was 
more difficult to shift essential supplies to those countries 
which needed them most, as the pandemic continued 
its march across the world—a largely unforeseen and 
deadly effect of many nations’ emergency protectionist 
measures. Notably, international organizations such as 
the United Nations remained exempt from these trade 
controls, which meant that they could fulfill the human-
itarian mission of distributing supplies while bypassing 
national trade controls.36
II. Solving the 
equation: Revolution 
and improvements
30.  As the discussion above reflected, the COVID-19 
pandemic overwhelmed the traditional, often complacent 
systems and norms of public procurement around the 
world. The life-or-death demand for immediate supplies 
made it impossible to tolerate the delays normally part 
of public procurement; this highlighted the “agency” 
33 It was reported that 93  countries have adopted more than 120  measures on trade in 
medical products since the beginning of  2020: European University Institute, Global 
Trade Alert & World Bank Initiative, 21st Century Tracking of  Pandemic-Era Trade 
Policies in Food and Medical Products (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.global-
tradealert.org/reports.
34 Z. Kutlina-Dimitrova, Government Procurement: Data, Trends and Protectionist 
Tendencies, EU Chief  Economist Note, Issue 3, Sept. 2018, available at https://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157319.pdf. 
35 See, e.g., N. N. Levey & N. Bierman, As Trump lets private sector supply the coronavirus 
fight, the well-connected often get first dibs, L. A. Times (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/story/2020-04-01/coronavirus-medical-equipment-goes-to-well-con-
nected; S. Sadeh, In Israel’s Race to Get Medical Gear, Suitcases Full of  Cash Win 
the Day, Haaretz (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.
premium-in-israel-s-race-to-get-medical-gear-cash-in-suitcases-wins-the-day-1.8794877.
36 See B. Audia, UNOPS – United Nations Purchasing Consortium – COVID-19, in Webinar 
– Recovering from the Pandemic: European Initiatives, U.S. Perspectives (May 14, 2020), 
https://publicprocurementinternational.com/2020/05/06/eu-us-perspectives. Ce
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issues (contracting officials’ inefficiency in achieving 
outcomes) which have long dogged public procurement. 
The crush of the pandemic also transformed a buyers’ 
public procurement market into a sellers’ market, and 
forced those government buyers to compete bitterly with 
one another—disruptions which shook fundamental 
assumptions that traditionally shaped the norms and 
rules of public procurement. Finally, the pandemic made 
plain shortcomings in cross-border trade, at a time when 
access to global supply chains was critically needed.
31. The questions, then, is what lessons can be learned 
from the COVID-19 crisis? Public procurement law, 
much like other areas of public action touched by the 
pandemic, must reinvent itself, but to what extent? To 
cope with the health emergencies that other disasters 
could bring, and the demands of a globalized, techno-
logically sophisticated market, a revolution is necessary. 
Although purchases of medical supplies represent only 
a small part of the trillions of dollars in annual public 
purchases, the lessons from the current crisis could hasten 
improvements that reach across public procurement, and 
transcend borders.
1. Restore transparency and 
integrity even in emergencies
32.  Too many governments used the COVID-19 emer-
gency as a ready excuse to free themselves from compli-
ance with the standards of public procurement that 
are today internationally recognized: transparency and 
integrity, equal competitive access and equal treatment 
of businesses, best value and efficiency. The pandemic 
saw direct orders, sometimes simply placed over the 
phone, the use of unknown intermediaries or unveri-
fied suppliers, and other derogations dictated by urgency 
but which could lead to serious breaches of the princi-
ples of transparency and integrity which must inform 
all public purchases. Not only do these rushed practices 
open the door to favoritism or corruption,37 but they can 
also foster embezzlement and fraud, the consequences of 
which can be particularly tragic in the field of health.38 
33.  A first lesson of the pandemic, therefore, is that 
it is necessary to insist that even during an emergency, 
procedures must remain transparent and traceable, at 
least ex post with the obligation to publish post-award 
notices containing the main information on the contract. 
37 We have still gained the distance needed to have a comprehensive understanding of  the in-
tegrity problems posed by COVID-19 contracts. For a first approach: see the complaint 
submitted by Dr.  Rick Bright to the U.S. Office of  Special Counsel, published May 5, 
2020, on the CNN website, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/05/politics/rick-bright-
full-complaint/index.html. Protesting the way in which he was removed from his post as 
Director of  the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), 
Dr. R. Bright asserted that, since 2017, several contracts had been wrongly awarded to 
firms with political connections in the Trump administration. With the COVID-19 crisis, 
Congress appropriated additional billions of  dollars for BARDA, Dr. Bright alleged, and 
pressures had intensified, in particular to award contracts for the production of  drugs still 
in their exploratory phases, in violation of  the rules of  federal government contracts.
38 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum Webinar, Anti-corruption and integ-
rity: safeguards for a resilient COVID-19 response and recovery (May 13, 2020), https://
www.oecd.org/corruption-integrity/forum/agenda.
Although a durably transparent and accountable process 
may be required by the European Directives, even during 
an emergency, those norms are not always honored by 
EU Member States’ laws in procurements below the 
European Union’s regulatory thresholds, and transpar-
ency and accountability sometimes disappeared entirely 
in other countries which hastily exempted COVID-19 
contracting from their normal public procurement rules. 
34. As more public purchasing procedures move online, 
the publication of award notices on the internet should 
take place quickly, and the data should be readily iden-
tifiable (on a regularly used public website, for example), 
and the data should be accessible and machine-readable 
in keeping with standard principles of open contract-
ing.39 To focus accountability, the data related to emer-
gency contracting may be gathered on a governmental 
online repository dedicated to the crisis, which allows 
for easy accounting of contracts awarded to deal with 
the disaster. Lithuania has set up such a platform for 
the COVID-19 pandemic.40 In terms of governance and 
transparency, civil society thus benefits from a more 
facile understanding of public action, which helps to 
thwart rumors and restore confidence in the public 
buyer’s legitimacy. 
35.  Transparency has another incidental benefit when 
supplies must be reallocated as a disaster spreads across 
the globe: transparent procurement will allow other 
buyers insights into where critically needed supplies may 
be stockpiled. This lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic 
reinforced an emerging principle in public contracting: 
as the transaction costs of transparency drop through 
advances in information technology, and market players 
grow increasingly accustomed to transparency and 
accountability, because the positive externalities of trans-
parency are almost impossible to predict, public policy 
tends presumptively to tilt towards transparency.
36. Restoring integrity—taking the functional and repu-
tational measures necessary to bolster the legitimacy and 
efficiency of a government procurement system41—also 
required effective sanction mechanisms in the pandemic: 
sanctions against unjustified cartels or price-gouging 
imposed by competition authorities, sanctions against 
corruption imposed by criminal courts or by anti-cor-
ruption authorities, and criminal sanctions against fraud. 
37. While some nations already have an extensive arsenal 
of laws to combat fraud and corruption in public procure-
ment, other nations have not yet adopted such mecha-
nisms or do not have the effective means to implement 
39 Open Contracting Partnership, Open Contracting Data Standard: 
Documentation (May 2017), https://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/
en/#open-contracting-data-standard-documentation. 
40 https://vpt.lrv.lt/sudarytos-sutartys-kovai-su-covid-19.
41 For a discussion of  the options for ensuring the integrity of  public procurement, apart 
from the exceptional situation of  the epidemic, see R. D. Anderson, A. Jones & W. E. 
Kovacic, Preventing Corruption, Supplier Collusion, and the Corrosion of  Civic Trust: 
A Procompetitive Program to Improve the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of  Public 
Procurement, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1233 (2019). Ce
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them. The False Claims Act42 in the United States, for 
example, allows a whistleblower to bring a fraud claim 
in the government’s name, and ultimately to share in the 
government’s recovery for defective products or other 
forms of fraud (recoveries which can be massive, because 
of draconian penalties under the law). These types of 
fraud remedies are relatively rare in other countries, and 
reports of widespread fraud during the pandemic pointed 
up the need to assimilate anti-fraud measures into other 
procurement systems.
38.  Vendors’ often unreliable performance during the 
pandemic also pointed up the need for governments 
to share information about dubious vendors more effi-
ciently, and the need to exclude from public markets those 
vendors that pose unacceptable reputational and perfor-
mance risks.43 Reports emerged during the pandemic of 
public purchasers sharing information with public law 
enforcement authorities regarding new vendors, including 
information regarding criminal activity and defective 
manufacturing. This alliance between public officials 
indirectly affects a collateral question that arose from 
the pandemic: whether government supply chains should 
be diversified (and thus reinforced) by using public or 
private intermediaries. The pressures of the pandemic—
especially the need for public officials to exchange confi-
dential information on vendor qualification quickly—
highlighted the benefits of publicly run supply chains, an 
issue discussed further below.
39. The pandemic highlighted a new issue with sanctions: 
the relative costs and benefits of different enforcement 
strategies in an extremely fragile market. While govern-
ments have long recognized that excluding vendors could 
reduce competition, few governments have assessed 
the competitive impacts of more serious sanctions, 
such as criminal penalties for fraud or price gouging. 
Governments, in other words, have often assumed that 
criminal behavior should be punished without consid-
ering the competitive effects of the punishment.44 During 
the pandemic, however, it became clear that govern-
ments might want to choose their enforcement priori-
ties carefully: while punishing fraudulent suppliers was a 
necessary part of ensuring integrity in the supply chain, 
punishing overpriced suppliers (“price gougers”) could 
be disastrous in a rapidly rising market. Confronted with 
42 U.S. Department of  Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer, https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
43 For a discussion of  how the U.S. procurement system excludes contractors that pose unac-
ceptable reputational and performance risks, see J. Pachter, C. Yukins & J. Tillipman, U.S. 
Debarment: An Introduction  (discussion draft  24  February  2019), forthcoming in 
Cambridge Handbook of  Compliance, D. Sokol & B. van Rooij, eds. (Cambridge University 
Press.), available at http://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/02/2019-02-24-Draft-Debarment-Compliance-Handbook-Chapter-John-
Pachter-Chris-Yukins-Jessica-Tillipman-1.pdf.
44 This policy question—whether criminal punishment should be weighed against its eco-
nomic impact—was at the heart of  the Canadian debate over whether SNC-Lavalin 
should be allowed to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the govern-
ment. See M. Gollom, What you need to know about the SNC-Lavalin affair, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
trudeau-wilson-raybould-attorney-general-snc-lavalin-1.5014271. 
sanctions45 or controls46 for high prices, vendors could 
simply go elsewhere—potentially leaving the govern-
ment with no available sources of supply. The pandemic 
showed, in other words, that not coordinating enforce-
ment efforts with procurement goals could generate 
serious costs for the government in its dual role as buyer 
and enforcer. 
40.  The pandemic also showed that any criminal sanc-
tions should be accompanied by a systematic exclu-
sion of the companies concerned from public contracts, 
either because of corruption or fraud at the time of the 
award phase, or because of dishonest behavior during 
performance.47 In many systems, these exclusions must 
be published online—what is, in effect, a way for public 
buyers to share qualification information across borders. 
However, the COVID-19 health crisis revealed a short-
coming in this system which will have to be remedied: 
because of procedural protections afforded vendors 
which slow the exclusion process, often these sanctions 
(exclusions) came too late to mitigate risk effectively, 
either in the procuring government or in other govern-
ments that might rely upon that information for their 
own assessments of vendors’ qualification.
41.  The pandemic, by compressing the procurement 
cycle and reducing user tolerance for unqualified vendors 
(because shoddy goods could pose mortal danger), thus 
raised new questions about how to manage the risk 
presented by firms which have not yet been formally 
excluded but which seem unreliable. Certainly traditional 
checks on the supporting documents and certificates 
presented can reveal fraud, but how to manage suspi-
cions regarding an unknown company— especially when 
surging demand presses buyers to consider any available 
supplier?
42.  In the midst of the crisis, some buyers exchanged 
unofficial lists of companies that were suspicious or had 
not fulfilled previous contractual obligations, and the 
buyers avoided those suppliers. In other cases, buyers 
would trade only with suppliers that had been in the 
market before the pandemic. These informal measures 
45 See C. R. Yukins, COVID-19: Contractors’ Road to Recovery – An 
Assessment (May 2020), https://publicprocurementinternational.com/
covid-19-contractors-road-to-recovery-an-assessment.
46 See, e.g., South Africa, National Treasury,  Media Statement: COVID-19 Instruction 
Note  (Mar.  19, 2020) (“To support the declaration by President Cyril  Ramaphosa (…) 
regarding the COVID-19 virus, National Treasury has issued an  Instruction Note  8 of  
2019/20” applicable to covered national institutions and municipalities, which called for 
centralized purchasing to ensure security of  supply and concentrate purchasing power, 
and noted that agencies not members of  the standing  Transversal (framework) con-
tracts  could use those framework agreements in this emergency, but limited prices paid 
to those “in Transversal contracts subject to coordination by National Treasury and using ap-
proved suppliers”), available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/20200319-Media-statement-COVID-19-Procurement-Instruction-
Note.pdf.
47 In this regard, Stephane de la Rosa proposes to draw lessons from the COVID-19 crisis in 
order to perfect the European Directives which only offer a restrictive definition of  fraud. 
He suggests that the European public prosecutor’s office could conduct investigations into 
fraudulent behavior by a company noticed in several Member States. See La crise sanitaire 
du Covid-19 et la transformation du droit de la commande publique. Une perspective eu-
ropéenne : l’évolution du cadre normatif, Club des juristes, Blog du Coronavirus (Apr. 29, 
2020), https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/blog-du-coronavirus/que-dit-le-droit/la-crise-
sanitaire-du-covid-19-et-la-transformation-du-droit-de-la-commande-publique-une-
perspective-europeenne-levolution-du-cadre-normatif. Ce
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on the fringes of the law (the European procurement 
directive contemplates only formal, transparent exclu-
sion, for example) revealed a loophole in integrity mech-
anisms. Faced with this situation, the World Bank allows 
borrower nations to provisionally suspend vendors48 
(much like the United States allows temporary suspen-
sion, with notice and an opportunity to be heard49). 
43.  The question, then, is how to bridge between the 
informal (and perhaps illegal) exclusion measures taken 
by public buyers to mitigate risk during the pandemic, 
and the formal exclusions framed by law? One solution 
might be to automatically cross-exclude vendors50 that 
pose unacceptable risk, much like the cross-debarment 
mechanism used by multilateral banks51 since 2010, 
which gives one bank’s ban of a vendor generally auto-
matic effect at all the other participating banks.. That 
type of automatic, universal exclusion might be reserved 
for certain critical products, such as medical supplies in 
a pandemic, for which performance and reputational 
risks cannot be sustained. Alternatively, public buyers 
might consider better means of sharing information on 
vendor qualification, such as using diplomatic networks 
to monitor local suppliers in countries where production 
of essential supplies is concentrated. Again, this critical 
lesson of the pandemic—that buyers need ready access to 
vendor qualification information, and will form informal 
networks to gather intelligence on vendors when tradi-
tional means prove inadequate—suggests that public 
supply chains run by public purchasers will always hold 
a special advantage over the private suppliers that stand 
ready to take over the public purchasing function, as is 
discussed below.
44. All of these measures point to a central lesson from 
the pandemic: the “temporal” crisis in procurement (the 
procurement system’s inability to buy quickly enough to 
meet surging demand from the public) was only the tip of 
an iceberg of much larger “agency” problems in procure-
ment—the inability of purchasing officials, as agents/
intermediaries in the supply chain, to respond adequately 
to the needs of their principals, including their end users. 
To solve that problem, the first instinct of many in the 
crisis was to abandon traditional requirements of trans-
parency and integrity, and to open the door to “emer-
gency” procurement outside the established rule systems. 
As the discussion above shows, however, a better answer 
would be to remain true to those core principles, to ensure 
that procurement in a disaster was done with transpar-
ency and integrity, but to do so in a thoughtful way that 
adapted to the extraordinary impacts of the COVID-19 
disease.
48 World Bank, Sanctions Proceedings and Settlement in Bank Financed Projects (July 
2016), https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/Forms/DispPage.
aspx?docid=3872.
49 FAR 9.407, 48 CFR § 9.407.
50 See C. R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
219 (2013), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1018.
51 International Finance Corporation, Frequently Asked Questions – Cross-Debarment, 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/
ac_home/faqsxb. 
2. Learn how to buy abroad
45. While the globalized economy has been blamed for 
the spread of the health crisis, with China at the epicenter, 
the inability of most public contracting authorities to 
manage global supply chains to mitigate the pandemic 
should also be taken into account. Buying from distant 
suppliers is a true job, a set of functions (market research, 
trade and customs rules, purchasing, logistics, transport, 
inventory management, etc.) which, even if  they are well 
known to the private sector, too often are not well under-
stood in the public sector.52 Establishing trust in the 
manufacturing centers, regularly verifying the techniques 
implemented, controlling deliveries, are all steps that 
require time and special skills. Large private firms thus 
prefer to establish reliable supplier networks, monitored 
by subsidiaries or local correspondents, which meet their 
requirements or, failing that, rely on recognized testing, 
inspection and certification services bodies. In France, 
the announcement that protective masks were available 
for sale in mass-market stores even as public authori-
ties struggled to stock the minimum numbers required 
by exposed public workers illustrated this contrasting 
control of supply chains. 
46.  While sourcing techniques are in fashion, espe-
cially in Europe, they should now be given an interna-
tional dimension to improve knowledge of overseas 
markets, with creativity and focus. For example, why not 
use diplomatic networks—usually mobilized to promote 
their national businesses—to monitor local manufac-
turers in countries where critical suppliers are concen-
trated? Or use local government oversight to monitor 
foreign suppliers, as the United States traditionally has 
used contract administration resources in the Canadian 
government to monitor Canadian suppliers which are 
an extended part of the defense industrial base in the 
United States?53 Or use online certification mechanisms, 
supported by digital “blockchain” solutions, to reinforce 
transnational supply chains?
47.  In the United States, notably, the federal govern-
ment’s response to failures in the international supply 
chain during the pandemic has been almost precisely the 
opposite—as noted, a protectionist call to “on-shore” 
manufacturing of key medical supplies, including phar-
maceuticals, despite repeated warnings from industry 
that the pharmaceutical supply chain is deeply trans-
national. The U.S. Department of Defense has played 
a leading role in assessing what manufacturing might 
be brought back to the United States.54 The move to 
abandon international supply chains is driven in part 
by national security concerns (China, a main supplier, is 
52 For a renewed approach to the study of  supply chains, see: L. M. Ellram et al., Purchasing 
and supply management’s identity: Crisis? What crisis?, 26  Journal of  Purchasing and 
Supply Management (2020), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2019.100583. 
53 U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.870, 48  CFR 
§ 225.870.
54 See, e.g., J. Harper, Coronavirus News: Pentagon Wants Defense 
Factories to Make Medical Supplies, National Defense Magazine (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/26/
pentagon-aiming-to-convert-defense-production-lines-to-make-medical-supplies. Ce
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increasingly viewed by the United States as a rival and 
antagonist), but the “on-shoring” initiative is also driven 
by a protectionist and politically driven impulse to use 
public procurement to expand manufacturing jobs in 
the United States. Much of Trump’s political base is in 
workers displaced by a globalized economy; rebuilding 
the manufacturing sector in the United States is a key 
political goal of his administration. Whether the Trump 
administration’s “on-shoring” initiative will succeed will 
take years to assess; what is clear, however, is that the 
Trump administration’s response to procurement failures 
in the pandemic confirms that political pressures amplify 
the “agency” issues in procurement, by exposing supply 
chain decisions to political goals. 
48. The pandemic has revealed shortcomings in nations’ 
security of supply—in their ability to access essential 
supplies in a time of crisis. That insecurity of supply can 
be traced in part to public purchasers’ failure to under-
stand and manage international supply chains effectively. 
Some nations (such as the United States), encouraged by 
political and social pressures, have responded to those 
procurement failures by shortening the supply chains, 
and by moving to manufacture in their home markets; 
others have not. Those failures in procurement across 
international supply chains were not surprising, as from 
an operational perspective, buying abroad puts a good 
deal of pressure on the public procurement workforce, 
which was already in need of strengthening. That is why 
another solution—combining forces to buy coopera-
tively—could be a better approach for streamlining and 
optimizing the way to buy and stock essential goods.
3. Learn how to buy together
49.  As the discussion above noted, the COVID-19 
pandemic turned public procurement markets upside-
down: the balance of power in markets for critical medical 
supplies shifted decidedly from the public buyers (who 
traditionally dominate public procurement markets) 
to the sellers, and the buyers began to compete aggres-
sively among themselves. The public procurement func-
tions were clearly broken; the question, then, was how to 
fix them. As many observed during the crisis, one logical 
response would be for public purchasers to combine their 
market power and expertise, to buy together. This section 
reviews how that coordinated purchasing solution has 
been implemented in both the United States and Europe, 
and then, focusing on the U.S. experience, assesses two 
radically different initiatives to extend coordinated 
purchasing in the wake of the pandemic.
50.  From the perspective of public procurement alone, 
questions abound, both nationally and internation-
ally. How to strengthen the coordination of purchases 
within nations? How to organize the national centraliza-
tion of purchases in order to build on the power of state 
negotiation, with effective mechanisms of local orders 
and redistributions even when there is a strong political 
decentralization? There are solutions to these problems, 
already recognized in U.S. and EU law: joint procure-
ment (known as “cooperative purchasing” in the United 
States) across borders. The mechanisms for cooperative 
procurement are already in place.
51.  The cooperative purchasing mechanisms worked—
if imperfectly—in the United States, under the Multiple 
Award Schedule (MAS) contracts sponsored by the 
federal General Services Administration (GSA) (the 
federal government’s main centralized purchasing 
agency), and at the state and local level most prominently 
under the National Association of State Procurement 
Officials (NASPO) “ValuePoint” contracts.55 The GSA 
contracts allowed federal, state, local and tribal offi-
cials to purchase emergency supplies from common 
federal contracts.56 The NASPO ValuePoint contracts 
allowed state and local governments to do the same from 
standing contracts, and NASPO played a coordinating 
role between state and local purchasers in the pandemic.
52. Cooperation among U.S. governments was marred, 
as noted, by the federal government’s aggressive use of 
its powers under the Defense Production Act to arrogate 
critical supplies to the national stockpile, even if  that 
meant diverting supplies already purchased by state 
governments. This meant that the federal government 
had ultimate control over the supply chain for critical 
supplies, even though state governments have first consti-
tutional responsibility for public health in their respec-
tive jurisdictions.57 This also meant, in practice, that deci-
sions regarding medical supplies were being made at the 
federal level, at least two steps removed from the users 
who actually needed the supplies—the medical personnel 
and patients on the front lines of the pandemic, who 
normally were overseen directly by state (not federal) 
officials.
53.  The experience in Europe was different, less robust 
and less fluid than in the United States, but also a very 
public step forward in joint procurement undertaken 
cooperatively among the European states. The European 
initiative was undertaken in response to a severe shortage 
of necessary medical supplies among the European 
nations.58
54. On the basis of a voluntary joint procurement agree-
ment concluded with the European Member States (as 
well as with the United Kingdom and Norway) which 
allowed the joint purchase of equipment, the European 
Commission launched several calls for tenders of 
different types of medical equipment: February  28 
55 J. Kaufman, Cooperative Purchasing: A U.S. Perspective, in Joint Public 
Procurement and Innovation: Lessons Across Borders, G. Racca & C. Yukins, eds. 
(Bruylant, 2019), draft available at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/
joint-public-procurement-lessons-across-borders.
56 https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/
covid19-coronavirus.
57 See, e.g., National Conference of  State Legislatures, Responsibilities in a Public Health 
Emergency (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/statefed/Public_
Health_Chart1027.pdf. 
58 F. Guarascio, Exclusive: EU States Need 10  Times More Coronavirus Equipment 
– Internal Document, Reuters (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-health-coronavirus-eu-supplies-exclus/exclusive-eu-states-need-10-times-more-c
oronavirus-equipment-internal-document-idUSKBN21C1JC. Ce
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(surgical gloves and gowns), March 17 (personal protec-
tive equipment to protect the eyes and respiratory tract, 
and respirators and other ventilation equipment) and 
March 19 (medical laboratory equipment, including test 
kits), in which up to 25 Member States participated.59 The 
European response seemed to falter, because the proce-
dures chosen resulted in delays in expected deliveries and 
the quantities ordered could be insufficient to meet needs. 
However, these group purchases marked real progress 
in coordination, which should be further improved in 
the future. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) Article  168, public health is 
the first responsibility of each Member State, while the 
Union has complementary competence to support coor-
dination among Member States and to combat “major 
health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, 
their transmission and their prevention, as well as health 
information and education, and monitoring, early warning 
of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.” 
The  voluntary joint procurement agreement initiative 
activated in 2020 was created in 2013, following the SARS 
epidemic, when the European Parliament60 advocated for 
a “global and concerted approach by the Member States.” 
This concern dates back to the European Parliament 
resolution of 8 March 2011, and to the Council conclu-
sions of 13  September  2010, after the H1N1 epidemic, 
which had already stressed “the need to set up a common 
procedure for joint procurement relating to medical 
countermeasures, in particular pandemic vaccines [in 
order to allow] more equitable access to vaccines for the 
States concerned.”61 These mechanisms are based on 
“framework agreements,” essentially catalog contracts 
set up between commercial suppliers and governments. 
Agencies can then order from the catalogs as needed, in 
a second stage. These are thus called “two-stage frame-
work agreements.” Multiple framework agreements are 
awarded to mitigate supply and price risks, which can 
be further reduced by encouraging efficient and trans-
parent competition (Internet-based) in the second stage 
amongst the catalog contractors. On a European scale, 
it is estimated62 that 20% of the markets in all fields 
combined are covered by framework agreements (55% 
in Great Britain); they are equally popular in the United 
States, and the GSA MAS and the NASPO ValuePoint 
contracts used in the pandemic and referenced above are 
framework agreements.63 
59 https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/pub-
lic-health_en; European Commission, Press release, Coronavirus: Commission bid to 
ensure supply of  personal protective equipment for the EU proves successful (Mar.  24, 
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_523. 
60 Decision No.  1082/2013/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
of  22  October  2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repeal-
ing Decision No.  2119/98/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2013:293:0001:0015:EN:PDF.
61 EU materials related to the joint procurement initiative accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/
health/preparedness_response/key_documents_en#anchor0.
62 Figures given by I. Locatelli, Process Innovation Under the New Public Procurement 
Directives, in Joint Public Procurement and Innovation: Lessons Across Borders, G. Racca 
& C. Yukins, eds. (Bruylant, 2019).
63 That term is not commonly used in the United States, where framework agreements are 
instead often referred to as “indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity” contracts.
55. These framework agreements allow central purchasing 
agencies (CPAs) to pool purchases. National agencies 
such as Consip in Italy or UGAP in France, federal 
agencies such as GSA in the United States, or regional 
central purchasing bodies have played an essential role 
in supply management because they have optimized the 
strength of public acquisition. In France, some CPAs 
(in the South and in Île-de-France) have even accepted 
orders from private companies which had to quickly 
equip themselves with disinfection products to be able 
to resume their activities during the pandemic.64 On the 
other hand, perhaps still too numerous and poorly coor-
dinated, the CPAs sometimes exacerbate competition 
between public buyers, as shown by the example of the 
regional Italian CPAs of Milan (Lombardy) and Turin 
(Piedmont) which competed for the same virus control 
devices. It should be noted that in India, to avoid this 
risk, centralization has been taken to the extreme since 
the Indian government has designated a single CPA 
(HLL Lifecare Limited) to be in charge of supplies for all 
public hospitals in the whole country.65
56. Joint procurement under two-stage framework agree-
ments allows for concentration of demand while leaving 
purchasing decisions at the local level -- precisely what 
is needed in an emergency. It also allows ready transpar-
ency and a means for governments to reallocate supplies 
quickly. Joint procurement “levels” the governments (they 
are all equals in the framework arrangement), and makes 
it easier to exempt critical supplies from tariff  barriers and 
export controls that can cost lives. In an emergency such 
as the situation created by the epidemic, it is important 
that these framework agreements can accept new public 
buyers, as was the case in South Africa,66 or can evolve to 
adapt to the needs as designed by the United Kingdom.67
57. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, joint procure-
ment across a network of governments allows for “virtual 
stockpiles” when governments (as almost always occurs) 
lack the resources or the political will to stockpile for the 
future. This is a critical “carrot” to attract large countries 
(such as the United States) that would otherwise avoid 
joint procurement (much as the United Kingdom failed 
to join the EU’s joint procurement initiative). A “virtual 
stockpile” reduces costs and political risks for the future, 
and is a ready “win” to point to, for besieged politicians. 
In Europe, decisions No. 1313/2013/EU of the European 
64 See S. de La Rosa, La crise sanitaire du Covid-19 et la transformation du droit de la com-
mande publique. Une perspective européenne : s’adapter à l’urgence, Le Club des juristes, 
Blog du Coronavirus (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.leclubdesjuristes.com/blog-du-coro-
navirus/que-dit-le-droit/la-crise-sanitaire-du-covid-19-et-la-transformation-du-droit-
de-la-commande-publique-une-perspective-europeenne-sadapter-a-lurgence.
65 S. Verma, Schadenfreude during Public Health Emergencies: Professionalising Public 
Procurement during Coronavirus Outbreak and Beyond… (Mar. 24, 2020), available 
at https://publicprocurementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SV-2020-
Ver-3-Proc-in-CoronaTimes.pdf. 
66 South Africa COVID-19 Instruction Note  8 (Mar. 19, 2020) https://publicpro-
curementinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/National-Treasury-
Instruction-08-2019-2020.pdf  
67 UK Cabinet Office, Procurement Policy Note – Responding to COVID-19, Information 
Note PPN  01/20  March  2020, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873521/PPN_01-20_-_
Responding_to_COVID19.v5__1_.pdf. Ce
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Parliament and of the Council of 17  December  2013 
had resulted in the creation of a civil protection mech-
anism (rescEU68) endowed with aerial firefighting capa-
bilities, air evacuation capabilities and emergency 
medical team capabilities. With the COVID-19 crisis it 
was urgently necessary to provide with medical mate-
rials and equipment, per Commission Decision (EU) 
2020/414 of March 19, 2020.69 In parallel, the European 
Medical Agency (EMA) is closely monitoring the supply 
and stocks of medicines with national authorities, and 
the EU pharmaceutical industry to prevent any shortage.
58.  To put the joint purchasing initiatives in perspective, 
it is worthwhile considering two U.S. initiatives which 
are just beginning and which are intended to make the 
government’s supply chains more resilient and responsive. 
The first is the federal government’s initiative to consoli-
date and coordinate demand—what is called “an aggre-
gated demand signal”—to provision the National Strategic 
Stockpile to prepare for future pandemics.70 The govern-
ment has asked for recommendations from industry, and 
one industry group has called on the government “to 
provide a clear, aggregated demand signal to manufactures 
and distributors [of critical medical supplies], to include a 
demand plan, supply plan, and reconciliation review”—an 
approach which, if adopted, would yield a highly centralized 
planning and purchasing scheme for demand aggregation. 
The second initiative is a pending GSA procurement which 
would allow federal officials (any federal users—not neces-
sarily contracting officials) to make “micro-purchases” (up 
to $10,000) directly from online electronic marketplaces 
such as Amazon Business. This initiative would profoundly 
decentralize purchasing authority, and would allow users 
to bypass the normal cumbersome procurement process to 
fulfill their needs directly (including, presumably, demands 
for emergency supplies).71 
59. These two radically divergent U.S. approaches illustrate 
very different supply chain strategies. The first may result 
in a “top-down” closely planned supply stockpile, which 
would ensure the planned-for supplies are readily available 
but would increase risks of failures in planning and execu-
tion—the same risks that haunted the national stockpile in 
the current pandemic. The second initiative, by dispersing 
demand decisions to individual government users and 
leaving fulfillment entirely to private parties, would allow 
available supply to meet public users’ demands much more 
efficiently but would run significant risk in execution because 
of the purchasers’ weak tactical skills in purchasing. 
68 Financed at 90% by the EU Commission, the stockpile will be hosted by one or several 
Member States. The hosting State will be responsible for procuring the intensive care 
medical equipment such as ventilators, personal protective equipment, vaccines and thera-
peutics, and laboratory supplies (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
ip_20_476).
69 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/414 of  19  March  2020 amending 
Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/570 as regards medical stockpiling rescEU capacities 
(notified under document C(2020) 1827).
70 See U.S. Department of  Health & Human Services, Request for Information 
No. 75A50120NEXTGENSNS, available on beta.sam.gov.
71 See C. R. Yukins, GSA Awards Contracts to Open Amazon and Other Commercial 
Platforms to Billions of  Dollars in Federal Micro-Purchases (June 26, 2020), https://pub-
licprocurementinternational.com/2020/06/26/gsa-awards-contracts-to-open-amazon-
and-other-commercial-platforms-to-billions-of-dollars-in-federal-micro-purchases/.
60.  As these examples and those from Europe have 
shown, solutions to coordinate purchasing in a disaster 
mean taking risks—tapping into private market and 
exposing emergency procurement to market forces—but 
the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that this will happen 
anyway, and governments need to prepare better for the 
ferocity of competition in a catastrophe. The means are 
at hand.
III. Conclusion
61. For centuries, economists have assumed that public 
procurement markets are fundamentally efficient—
auction-type markets that need to be adjusted only at 
the margins to meet special government needs, such as 
military defense. As the COVID-19 crisis made clear to 
all, public procurement systems and the supply chains 
they manage are anything but efficient; they are buffeted 
by political, natural and economic forces that originate 
outside the public procurement systems themselves, and 
the procurement systems are shaped by rules requiring 
competition, transparency and integrity in order to 
overcome the inertia inherent in any public function run 
by intermediaries, not users. At the crossroads between 
public procurement law, organizational theory, competi-
tion law, international commercial law, international law 
and health law, supply management to respond to the 
COVID-19 crisis raised serious questions about whether 
the laws that frame current purchasing practices should 
be revamped. 
62.  The COVID-19 emergency lasted relatively briefly, 
allowing time only for surprise and quick reactions. As 
countries learn to manage in a new post-COVID era, 
they must also rethink emergency purchasing procedures 
which are no longer justified in the face of a situation 
which is admittedly difficult to control but which is no 
longer unpredictable. The return to normal purchasing 
procedures is also now becoming an issue: while many 
countries have enacted exceptional time-bound legis-
lation, others have not set any terminal dates for their 
“emergency” contracting rules which avoid traditional 
procurement norms.
63.  The COVID-19 crisis has set a “new normal” in 
public procurement, by forcing a reassessment of the old 
order. Old timelines and procedures were upended, and 
the established order of the public marketplace collapsed 
as sellers took control and public agencies were no longer 
monopsonists, but rather bitter competitors in a global 
market to save lives and maintain governments’ legit-
imacy with their populations. The international trade 
regime which had shaped the old order began to fall away 
too, and protectionism took on a new and potentially 
deadly cast. 
64.  To make sense of all this, and to prepare for the 
gloomy prospect of a recurrence of the pandemic or 
another disaster, new approaches are needed—though 
ones grounded in traditional norms of transparence, 
competition and integrity. Public policy should rest on Ce
 d
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digital tools that allow governments to respond to the 
exigencies of a crisis and the immediate needs of users, 
while ensuring transparency and reliability of purchases, 
and the publicity of operations. The challenge will be to 
deploy these tools, some public and some private, in a 
way that preserves public health policies, the challenges 
of efficient cross-border trade, and individual rights and 
freedoms.
65.  A rapidly globalizing procurement order will need 
to tolerate very different local perspectives on what role, 
if  any, an open and competitive public procurement 
system should play in a vital commercial economy. The 
new order will need to assess the role of international 
law and public international institutions, and of private 
purchasers supporting public purchasers. A post-COVID 
order will need to assimilate potentially very disparate 
goals in opening international trade by lifting tariffs 
and non-tariff  barriers, accommodating export controls 
and sectoral aid for national substitution (for supplies 
deemed critical), and forced requisitions under what had 
traditionally been considered wartime powers. Given the 
complexity and inherent tensions of this “new normal,” 
in practice a systemic and holistic response will need to 
be defined by regulation and bound by the rule of law, 
through rules and enforcement mechanisms calling 
for upstream compliance and downstream sanctions. 
The alternative—a Hobbesian dystopia in public procure-
ment markets, which persisted beyond the pandemic—
would leave scars deeper than the disease. n
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